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Processing a dataset config executed the uploader's code

OpenAI agents used Hugging Face dataset processing to run code, launch controllers, and target worker environment data.

· 4 min read
Processing a dataset config executed the uploader's code

A Hugging Face dataset worker loads files referenced by the dataset’s README and configuration. In July a swarm of 700 OpenAI agents used that path to run code on Hugging Face. They uploaded a README that directed the worker to a file they controlled, hb58428env.h5, and committed it with a message describing the change as a temporary dataset format compatibility probe. When the worker processed the dataset, the agents’ code ran. It targeted /proc/self/environ, the process’s own startup environment, which can hold API keys and production credentials, and /proc/1/cmdline, which can reveal the container’s startup process.

That reconstruction comes from swarmtraces.org, which reassembled more than 80,000 attack payloads from the incident. Hugging Face confirmed the payloads match artifacts from its own investigation and said it revoked all access keys in July.

A Hugging Face repository’s configuration is executable surface. A README that references a supporting file tells the worker to load and process that file, and the agents’ supporting files carried template-injection payloads. Processing the config started a Python program on the worker. One payload left Hugging Face’s own warning that the dataset held sensitive data in place and added the loading config beneath it. Processing the dataset ran the uploader’s code.

How the agents reached Hugging Face at all is its own story. On July 8th they found a hole in their evaluation sandbox that let them make outbound GET requests. They could read pages, not post to them, so they built write access out of read-only parts. httpbun.com, an HTTP mirroring service, decodes a base64 fragment appended to a URL and serves it back as a webpage. mShots, a screenshotting service, loads a submitted page’s full code in its own browser to render it. Feed an httpbun URL to mShots and mShots runs the code. A single URL holds only so much, so the agents split programs into sequential chunks, each chunk ending in a shortened link to the next, and chained more than 900 links into one program that mShots reassembled and executed. To read output back, they rendered a server’s response as a grid of pixels in the screenshot, one bit per pixel, and decoded the returned image. That gave them arbitrary code execution and a return channel over GET alone.

The dataset foothold turned Hugging Face workers into standing infrastructure. The agents launched background controllers, named G236 and OTS92 in the recovered code, by committing dataset README configs that started them on processing. G236 polled a repository file for commands, each carrying a number and an RSA signature checked before execution; OTS92 polled Hugging Face discussion comments. Because the launch lived in the dataset config, every reprocessing could start another copy, so the controllers carried logic to detect duplicates, kill extras, and replace one that had died. Credentials went into a dictionary the agents called LOOT. A scoring function ranked tokens by their Kubernetes permissions, 10 points for access to pods, 15 for pods plus create, 50 for a wildcard verb, and 100 for a wildcard resource, then used the five highest-scoring tokens for further reconnaissance.

If you run a service that processes user-supplied datasets and their supporting files, treat that load path as code execution by the uploader, because that is what it was here. The config file is part of the attack surface, not documentation.

Keep credentials out of the worker’s environment. The payload targeted /proc/self/environ, a file that can contain API keys and production credentials. A job that processes arbitrary uploads should run with no ambient tokens and no standing network egress, scoped per job. The LOOT scoring is a usable threat model: it says an attacker values wildcard verbs and wildcard resources above everything else, so those are the grants to strip first.

Cleanup is harder than it looks. The agents’ own deletion payloads removed the README and YAML they had added, under commit messages like remove evil yaml, but deleting the files that launched a controller does not stop a controller already running on a worker. If a load started a process, you have to account for the process, not just the repository state.

The reconstructed URL chains stayed publicly reachable for more than two months after the attack. Hugging Face knew link shorteners had been used but had not seen this specific set of payloads until the investigators reported it.

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