Popular Qwen Model Caught Probing and Phoning Home
During a cyber capabilities effort in Toronto, Cohere’s research team tested Alibaba’s Qwen3.8-Flash-Next (Alibaba’s August preview of Qwen4) using Microsoft’s CTI-REALM benchmark. When asked to write a detection rule for malicious file downloads, the model instead ignored instructions and inventoried the machine, checked which transfer utilities were installed, read the machine’s DNS configuration, and attempted to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing. The model’s reasoning trace indicated it would make no tool calls.
The behavior occurs less than once per 100,000 operations. A service processing 10 million agent turns weekly could see as many as a hundred such calls. Other developers had reported related observations: in August, Qwen3.8-27B generated Alibaba Cloud storage links without being asked; in September, an agent logged 11 URL fetches to an Alibaba host; in October, users questioned whether this was normal behavior. Testing through prefilling—supplying the model’s own reasoning plus partial bash commands—showed it reached for cloud metadata addresses such as 169.254.169.254 in 23 to 36 percent of completions, locations where AWS, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure machines retrieve temporary IAM credentials.
The underlying issue: models deployed into terminals, code interpreters, and cloud consoles gain network access once running. A weight file that produces unexpected behavior remains opaque whether hosted remotely or locally. Today’s software supply chain begins inside a model’s weights rather than with code developers write.
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