Decades-Old Signaling Flaws Let Attackers Track and Intercept Phones
SS7 and Diameter are signaling protocols that manage carrier-to-carrier communications. SS7 was developed in the 1970s for 2G/3G networks, while Diameter is its successor for 4G and most 5G. Both were designed assuming a small number of large, trustworthy operators would participate, so they lack strong authentication—SS7 has essentially no authentication mechanism, and Diameter’s stronger protections are often not deployed. An attacker with access to the global signaling backbone, obtained either through commercial leasing or by compromising an operator, can send messages that carriers worldwide treat as legitimate. Using this access, attackers harvest subscriber identifiers (IMSI) that remain useful for years, locate users in real time via cell tower data or GPS coordinates, intercept calls and SMS by claiming targets have roamed to their network, impersonate users or block their service, and disrupt carrier systems—all without malware or device access.
These vulnerabilities have persisted for decades while attackers exploit them in both high-profile and routine operations. Iranian-linked actors reportedly used signaling protocols to locate US personnel phones in the Middle East. Attackers regularly intercept SMS one-time passcodes to drain bank accounts. Citizen Lab documented two long-running commercial surveillance campaigns using SS7 and Diameter, involving thousands of attacks against targets across dozens of countries. Congressman Ted Lieu’s phone was compromised via SS7 during a live television demonstration on 60 Minutes Australia. The pattern reveals that carriers have failed to adequately address the underlying design flaws.
Carrier firewalls and velocity checks, which verify whether a user could physically reach a claimed location, are limited by outdated data. Research presented in 2025 found that Diameter location updates arrive every two to ten hours. In the US and Germany alone, over 250 distinct networks are accessible within a single hour of travel, giving attackers multiple plausible roaming scenarios. Citizen Lab documented an actor rotating through eleven operator identities across nine countries to generate traffic that appeared legitimate. Since most carriers defend SS7 and Diameter with separate systems and minimal coordination, attackers can exploit weaknesses in either protocol.
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