The record is the authority
RFC 10023 reserves the _for-sale DNS leaf: a TXT record that advertises a live domain for sale to brokers without parking it or taking it down.
RFC 10023, an Informational RFC published in July 2026 and registered with IANA, reserves _for-sale as a DNS leaf node name. Publish a TXT record there and you announce that the domain above it is for sale, while the domain keeps resolving and serving as normal.
_for-sale IN TXT "v=FORSALE1;furi=https://example.com/for-sale"
This looks like parking and does the opposite. Parking swaps your site for a sales page and costs you every visitor the domain still has. A _for-sale record sits next to a live site in DNS, and a browser never sees it. The homepage keeps serving, mail keeps flowing, and you add or remove the record whenever you mean to. RFC 10023 is explicit that the convention is designed to run while the domain is still in active use.
It is also separate from registration data. WHOIS and RDAP tell you whether a name is registered; they say nothing about whether the holder will sell. A registered name can be for sale and an unregistered one can be worthless, and that gap is the reason the convention exists. The intended readers are brokers and automated availability services, not people browsing.
The signal a domain owner most wants to send has never had a channel. Someone willing to sell has no way to advertise it except a WHOIS contact that privacy redaction has usually stripped, so welcome enquiries never arrive and the ones that do are indistinguishable from spam. A broker or availability service resolves the name anyway, so one extra TXT lookup tells it what a rendered homepage could not.
Publishing a record
A record carries a mandatory version tag and at most one tag=value pair. Three value tags are defined: ftxt= for free text, furi= for a URI to negotiate through (https, mailto and tel are the usable schemes), and fval= for an asking price written as an uppercase currency code followed by the amount.
_for-sale IN TXT "v=FORSALE1;ftxt=Serious offers only"
_for-sale IN TXT "v=FORSALE1;furi=https://example.com/fs?d=eHl6"
_for-sale IN TXT "v=FORSALE1;fval=USD12500"
The rules worth getting right the first time:
v=FORSALE1;is mandatory and case-sensitive. It lets a processor separate a real record from an unrelated TXT record that a DNS wildcard expanded into that name.- One
tag=valuepair per record. To publish a price and a contact, publish two records in the same RRset and let the processor take what it understands. The pairs do not concatenate the way SPF strings do. - One character-string per record, 255 octets maximum, so nothing has to be reassembled during parsing.
- Keep the TTL at 3600 seconds or less. A stale record quoting a price you withdrew, or a domain you already sold, is worse than no record.
- Put it at a leaf.
_for-sale.example.comis valid at any level of the tree,xyz._for-sale.example.comis not, and records under.arpamust be ignored. - Remove it when the domain is no longer for sale. There is no “not for sale” value; absence is the only way to say no.
Sign the zone with DNSSEC if you can. An unsigned TXT record claiming your domain is for sale, at a price, with a contact URI, is an easy thing for someone else to forge.
Reading the other side
If you consume these records, treat the content as hostile input. ftxt= is attacker-controlled text and furi= is an attacker-controlled URI; the RFC’s own example content is <script>...</script>. Sanitise before display, and never auto-navigate a user to a furi= target without an explicit confirmation step. An advertised fval= price is indicative only: the RFC tells processors to show a disclaimer and never to treat it as a purchase commitment. Publishing the record commits the holder to nothing.
Verifying
dig +short TXT _for-sale.example.com
The answer should begin with v=FORSALE1; and hold at most one tag=value pair per string. Check the TTL is 3600 or lower. If the zone is signed, dig +dnssec TXT _for-sale.example.com returns a validating RRSIG.
The signal depends entirely on the name resolving. During a redemption or pendingDelete period, or when DNSSEC validation goes bogus, the name stops resolving and the for-sale record silently disappears along with it.
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