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Buffer overflow in OpenJDK's Base64 decoder enables unauthenticated RCE

Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) is a Base64-decoder overflow in OpenJDK 17, 21, 25 and 27 that can give pre-auth RCE on x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 VBMI.

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Buffer overflow in OpenJDK's Base64 decoder enables unauthenticated RCE

CVE-2026-114938, which the researcher Calif is calling Java4Shell, is a buffer overflow in OpenJDK’s Base64 decoder. The optimized decoder miscalculates the store mask for the padded tail of its input and writes past the end of the output buffer. The bug lives in the JIT-compiled fast path behind java.util.Base64.Decoder, so any application that decodes attacker-controlled Base64 can reach it. Login headers and file uploads are the obvious entry points.

Calif reports remote code execution without authentication against default configurations of Keycloak, Atlassian Jira and Confluence, JFrog Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate, and code execution after authentication against Apache Kafka, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit and Spinnaker. There is no universal exploit; each target needs its own chain built around how it feeds Base64 to the decoder. Other researchers have so far reproduced crashes and memory leaks rather than code execution, and Calif’s public proof of concept triggers the memory corruption without achieving RCE. Calif says it is holding its product-specific exploits back until people have had time to patch.

Exposure is narrower than the version list suggests, because the vulnerable code only runs on certain CPUs. Per Red Hat’s advisory, you need an x86-64 processor with AVX-512 VBMI (Intel Xeon from Ice Lake onward, AMD Zen 4 and newer), a JVM not started with -XX:UseAVX=2, and attacker-controlled Base64 reaching the decoder. ARM64 is not affected. Two servers running the same Java build can differ in exposure based on the silicon underneath them, so the CPU inventory matters as much as the Java version.

The affected versions are Java 17, 21, 25 and 27 from every vendor, until that vendor ships a fixed build. For Oracle Java SE that means anything before 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 or 27.0.1.1, released November 17. Standard Java 8 and 11 are clear, with one exception: Oracle lists its Java SE 8 Enterprise Performance Pack build (8u511-perf) as affected. The same JDK bundled inside an application, a container base image or a distribution package carries the bug too, so an inventory that only covers standalone runtimes will miss cases.

Calif rates the flaw 9.2 Critical under CVSS 4.0. Oracle scores it 8.1 under CVSS 3.1 and flags high attack complexity, which fits the facts: the decoder has to receive the right malformed input on the right hardware, and turning the overflow into reliable code execution is per-target work. As of November 18 there are no confirmed reports of exploitation in the wild, and the flaw is not in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Patching means moving to the fixed build for your Java line from your own vendor, since build numbers differ across them. Oracle’s fixes are the four above. Amazon Corretto has published fixed builds. Red Hat is expediting fixes for RHEL 8, 9 and 10 and its OpenJDK builds. Eclipse Temurin is rolling out 17.0.21.1+2, 21.0.13.1+2, 25.0.5.1+2 and 27.0.1.1+4 as each platform clears testing, with its Docker Hub images following once every binary for a version is out. Aikido has published patched Temurin images on a public ECR gallery as a stopgap for teams waiting on the official containers.

If you cannot patch yet, disable the optimization. Start affected JVMs with -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics. On x86-64, -XX:UseAVX=2 also closes the path, per Red Hat, but ARM64 JVMs do not recognize that flag and will refuse to start with it. Applications that decode a lot of Base64 will take a performance hit from turning the intrinsic off. Neither flag is a substitute for the patched build.

Prioritize internet-facing services that accept Base64 from outside, such as authentication endpoints and upload handlers; those are the likeliest to be hit. Once a named bug has a public crash PoC, working exploit code tends to follow before most fleets finish patching.

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